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Abstract
A positive relationship between socio-economic status (SES) and health, the
“health-wealth gradient”, is repeatedly found in many industrialized countries.
This study analyzes competing explanations for this gradient: causal eﬀects from
health to wealth (health causation) and causal eﬀects from wealth to health (wealth
or social causation). Using six biennial waves of couples aged 51-61 in 1992 from
the U.S. Health and Retirement Study, we test for causality in panel data models
incorporating unobserved heterogeneity and a lag structure supported by speciﬁ-
cation tests. In contrast to tests relying on models with only ﬁrst order lags or
without unobserved heterogeneity, these tests provide no evidence of causal wealth
health eﬀects. On the other hand, we ﬁnd strong evidence of causal eﬀects from
both spouses’ health on household wealth. We also ﬁnd an eﬀect of the husband’s
health on the wife’s mental health, but no other eﬀects from one spouse’s health
to health of the other spouse.
JEL Codes: C33, D31, I12, J14.
Keywords: health, inequality, aging, dynamic panel data models, causality.
∗Pierre-Carl Michaud: RAND, Santa Monica, and IZA Bonn. Corresponding address: 1776 Main
Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica CA 90407-2138; email: michaud@rand.org; fax: +1-310-574-
3950. Arthur van Soest: Tilburg University, Netspar and RAND; email: avas@uvt.nl. We thank
Jérome Adda, James Banks, Michael Hurd, Arie Kapteyn, Karl Scholz and James Smith for insightful
discussions, seminar participants at RAND, Bristol, Tilburg, Maynooth, Tor Vergata, Laval and the
2004 Young Economist Meeting in Warsaw for comments and Manuel Arellano for making available the
SNIV estimation code.
11 Introduction
One of the stylized facts in many industrialized countries is the positive association
between health and wealth at the micro level, the "health-wealth gradient." Explaining
this gradient has been a challenge for economists and other social scientists. Three types
of explanations exist: causal eﬀects from health to wealth, causal eﬀects from wealth to
health, and unobserved common factors that drive health and wealth in similar ways.
It is important to distinguish these explanations to understand the sources of health
inequalities and to design economic policy to improve welfare, health, and well-being.
Our paper diﬀers from existing studies in that we use that dynamic linear panel
data techniques to analyze the causal eﬀects, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and
several lagged dependent variables. For this purpose, we use six waves (1992-2002) of
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a representative sample from the US cohort
born between 1931 and 1941.
The main innovations are as follows. First, our dynamic panel data models do not
only allows for unobserved heterogeneity, but also for a lag structure that is selected on
the basis of speciﬁcation tests and thus supported by the data. We explore the sensitivity
of our causality test results to diﬀerent sets of assumptions, particularly concerning the
number of lags. A new ﬁnding is that the latter is quite important - speciﬁcation tests
show that two to three lags are needed to ﬁt the data, and models with only one lag
indeed lead to diﬀerent (biased) conclusions. Thus, while existing studies use multiple
data sources and many diﬀerent speciﬁcations, an important methodological contribution
of our study is to show that for a given data set, conclusions depend crucially on the
speciﬁcation.
Our main ﬁnding concerns the causal eﬀects of wealth on health. Existing studies
often ﬁnd causal eﬀects of household wealth on indexes of health. We show that this
result disappears completely if we allow for unobserved heterogeneity and a lag structure
supported by speciﬁcation tests. In our preferred model speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd a strong
causal eﬀect of health on wealth, but no eﬀect of wealth on health. Several robustness
2checks conﬁrm this conclusion.
Our model considers couples, looking at household wealth and at health of both
spouses. It thus also incorporates several explanations why health indexes of spouses
are correlated, an issue which, to the best of our knowledge, is not addressed in a panel
data context in the existing literature. In our preferred model with aggregate measures
of health, we ﬁnd no evidence of a causal eﬀect of health of one spouse on health of the
other spouse. When we disaggregate our measure of health, however, we ﬁnd a causal
eﬀect of the husband’s health on the wife’s mental health two years later.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the health-wealth gradient
and its potential sources, and existing studies on causal eﬀects from health to wealth
and wealth to health. In section 3 we describe the association between wealth and health
and its time trend in our data. In section 4, the econometric framework is presented,
with the identiﬁcation, testing, and estimation strategies. Section 5 presents the results
for the dynamic panel data models. In Section 6 we perform a sensitivity analysis and
compare the results with those of simpler models. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Health-Wealth Gradient and Its Sources
In the United States, respondents to the 1984 wave of the Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics (PSID) who reported excellent health had almost 75% higher median wealth
than those who reported fair or poor health (Smith, 1999). Ten years later the ratio
between median wealth of the same groups had grown to 274%. The ratio in 1984 was
largest for the age group 45-54, 176%, which increased to 264% in 1994. Although often
less pronounced than in the U.S., a similar relation between socioeconomic status (SES)
and health (the "health-SES gradient") is found in most industrialized countries with
similar levels of health care technology and economic welfare (Wilkinson, 1996).
Understanding the sources of the health - wealth gradient is important to explain
health inequalities and for policies aimed at improving welfare, health, and well-being
(see, e.g., Deaton and Paxson, 1998). The gradient is also important because of the
3relation between health, retirement, and incentives of social security beneﬁts and health
insurance. Better health is positively associated with savings, labor force participation,
and earnings, and negatively with the old age social security beneﬁts replacement rate.
Medicare availability at age 65 may explain the retirement peak in the US at that age,
where social security incentives no longer apply (Rust and Phelan, 1997). Since the
importance of public health insurance depends on health as well as SES, the health-
SES relations are relevant for the debate on universal health care and the eﬃciency of
proposed reforms.
Attempts to understand the diﬀerent causal eﬀects ("pathways") through which so-
cioeconomic status and health aﬀect each other have been numerous (see Smith, 1999
and Adler et al., 1994 for reviews). Causal pathways from health to wealth (also referred
to as health causation) can be explained in a health production framework (cf. Gross-
man, 1972). Health and health expectations can aﬀect productivity, hourly wages, and
labor supply at the intensive and extensive margin, thus driving retirement decisions
and the capacity to accumulate savings for retirement. Moreover, health directly aﬀects
expenditures, particularly in the US where about 20% of workers younger than 65 are
not covered by health insurance and where copayments and additional health costs are
substantial (Smith, 2005).
Pathways from wealth or, more generally, SES to health (SES or wealth causation)
have been studied extensively in other social sciences (Adler et al., 1994) and economics
(Adams et al., 2003; Adda, 2003; Hurd and Kapteyn, 2003; Meer et al., 2003; Smith,
2005). Potential SES health mechanisms are access to health care, health knowledge
(cf. Kenkel, 1991), risk behavior (smoking and drinking; cf. Marmot, 2000), and wealth
inequalities and the stress of being at the bottom of the distribution (Wilkinson, 1996;
Marmot, 2000).
A third category of explanations for the gradient are early childhood factors. Several
studies (Barker, 1997; Lindeboom et al., 2006; Ravelli et al., 1998) show that health
is partly determined by health of the parents or health in early childhood, which will
be related to the parents’ SES and, due to the strong intergenerational correlation of
4SES, this can explain part of the health-SES gradient later in life. In our analysis of
people aged 50 and over, such eﬀects arise as permanent health shifts throughout the
observation window, and we will model them as time persistent unobserved heterogeneity.
Similar unobserved heterogeneity terms may drive household wealth, and the unobserved
heterogeneity in household wealth and in health of both spouses can be correlated.
Earlier studies have aimed at disentangling these sources of the health-wealth gradi-
ent (Adams et al., 2003, Adda, 2003, Smith, 2005, Wu, 2003, and Meer et al., 2003). In
these studies, non-causality is tested either without a rich lag structure or without con-
trolling for unobserved heterogeneity, or both. As argued by Hausman (2003) and Mealli
and Rubin (2003), this may bias the estimates and the test results, possibly explaining
why the null of no causality is often rejected in both directions.
In this paper, we develop dynamic panel data models that make it possible to test
for health and wealth causation, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, using the
econometric framework of Arellano and Bond (1991). Alonso-Borrego and Arellano
(1999) emphasize that dynamic vector autoregressive panel data models oﬀer an ade-
quate framework for performing such tests. We apply the models to the HRS cohort of
couples with at least one spouse born between 1931 and 1941 who are observed over six
biennial waves from 1992 to 2002. We consider health for each spouse and wealth at the
household level, as in Wu (2003). We consider two types of models - models without
instantaneous eﬀects of wealth on health and vice versa, in which no instruments are
needed, and structural models with instantaneous links between health and wealth. In
the latter models, we use the instruments of Smith (2005), Wu (2003), and Meer et al.
(2003). In addition, we impose mean stationarity to increase eﬃciency of the estimates
(avoiding potential weak instruments problems), following Blundell and Bond (1998).
3 Wealth and Health in the HRS cohort
The Health and Retirement Study is a longitudinal survey of individuals aged 51-61 in
1992 in the US. Data were collected every two years and cover a wide range of aspects
5of the life of the 50+ population. In 1992, 12,652 interviews were conducted for a
random sample of individuals born 1931-1941. Spouses of these individuals were included
irrespective of their age. We use the public release ﬁle from the RAND Corporation that
merged records from the six available waves (1992-2002).1 We selected all couples in the
1992 wave with complete information on the relevant variables. We retained observations
with missing or bracket information on one or more components of wealth, using imputed
values provided with the data set (see Hoynes et al., 1998). We observe couples until one
spouse dies, until divorce or separation, or until at least one member of the household
could not (or refused to) be interviewed. We do not analyze widows and widowers or
divorced or separated spouses, since our models focus on the relation between wealth
and health of both spouses.
Of the 4,160 households in 1992, 2,463 remained until 2002, implying an average
annual attrition rate of about 5%.2 For sample size, attrition rates, and some descriptive
statistics, see See Appendix A.3 Those who exit before the end of the panel are on average
older, because of increasing mortality at older age. Attritors have slightly less education
than respondents who remain in the panel for all six waves, while Blacks and Hispanics
are more likely to exit than others.
Wealth Data
Liquid wealth consists of individual retirement accounts (IRAs), stocks, bonds, certiﬁ-
cate deposits, T-bills/saving bonds, checking/saving accounts and other savings, net
of ﬁnancial debts (excluding mortgages). Non-liquid wealth includes the net value of
the primary residence, other real estate, and vehicles.4 Wealth includes the value of
life insurances and other annuities (in "other savings") but not the value of deﬁned
1See http://www.rand.org/labor/aging/dataprod/.
2From life-table ﬁgures, yearly death rates for this cohort vary from 0.5% to 2.6% over the decade
considered (Berkeley Mortality Database: http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/wilmoth/mortality/).
3All appendices are available upon request from the authors.
4We do not include business assets. These are nonzero for only few respondents but vary enormously
over time for some respondents.
6contribution pension plans. We will use log transformed wealth to reduce the eﬀect of
outliers.5
Table 1 describes the sample composition of wealth. It gives the median of each
component conditional on ownership (and holding a positive amount) and the ownership
rates for the 1992 and 2002 waves. In 1992, respondents held more than two thirds of
their wealth in non-liquid assets, mainly the primary residence. The share of non-liquid
assets in total wealth falls over the decade. Participation in stocks and IRAs is much
more important in the US than in many other countries (Hurd, 2001). The median
value of stocks and IRAs more than doubled over the 10 years, partly reﬂecting the high
returns on these assets throughout this period.
[Table 1 about here]
Health Variables
Table 2 summarizes the health information for the 1992 and 2002 waves. In 1992,
16.7% (23.8%) of wives (husbands) had suﬀered from a condition that Smith (2005)
labels as severe: cancer, heart condition, lung disease, or a stroke (or a combination
of these). About one in every ﬁve respondents experienced their ﬁrst severe health
condition between the 1992 and the 2002 interview. In 2002, 81.3% of husbands (79.9%
of wives) had experienced the onset of a mild health condition, mostly arthritis or high
blood pressure. Emotional and psychological health problems are much more frequent
for wives than for husbands, in line with the diﬀerences in CESD scores, combining eight
yes/no indicators for mental and emotional health (e.g., whether respondents agree with
the statement "everything is an eﬀort"). The Body-Mass Index (BMI) increased more
over time for wives than for husbands. The percentage having diﬃculties with activities
of daily living (ADL) also increased over time and was always larger for wives than for
5To deal with zero wealth (0.5-1% of the observations per wave) and negative wealth (2-3% of the
observations per wave), we use the following symmetric log transformation: log(y) = 1(y ≥ 0)log(1+y)
−1(y < 0)log(1 − y); for positive values, this is virtually identical to log wealth. In the empirical
analysis, we also compare with the hyperbolic transformation used by Adams et al. (2003).
7husbands. We also use self-reported health, which conveys general information about
health on top of speciﬁc onsets (cf., e.g., Hurd and Kapteyn 2003).
A "constructed health index" (CHI) combines the indicators presented in Table 2,
using principal component (see Appendix B (available upon request) for its construc-
tion). The index is normalized such that it has mean 0 and variance 1. Low values of
the index refer to good health and high values to bad health. Most health variables con-
tribute substantially to the CHI, with the highest score for self-reported health. To check
the robustness of our ﬁndings, the empirical analysis will also consider some alternative
health measures, e.g., not including self-reported health.
CHI of husband and wife are positively correlated. For example, 38% of wives with
husbands in the best health quartile are in the best health quartile themselves, compared
to only 16% of wives with husbands in the worst health quartile.6 This can be due to
causal mechanisms (e.g. stress due to a health problem of the spouse), assortative
mating, or common factors aﬀecting both spouses’ health in the same way (e.g. the
environment, socio-economic position, or risk behavior).
[Table 2 about here]
Association between Wealth and Health
Table 3 reveals the health-wealth gradient in the 1992 and 2002 waves (cf. Smith, 1999,
Table 1). It presents median household wealth by 1992 health quartile (using CHI as
the health measure). In 1992, median household wealth of husbands in the best health
quartile was more than twice as high as median household wealth of husbands in the
worst health quartile. The same health diﬀerential is found between health quartiles of
wives in 1992. The wealth diﬀerential increased further in 2002. These diﬀerences are
of similar magnitude as those found by Hurd and Kapteyn (2003) and Smith (1999),
who used self-reported general health instead of CHI. The large diﬀerences do not only
appear in the tails of the distribution: even among the households with relatively healthy
6A chi-square test rejects independence of CHI’s of both spouses (p-value < 0.001).
8wives in the second quartile of the husbands’ CHI distribution in 1992, median wealth
is 16.2 to 26.5% lower than in the top health quartile.
[Table 3 here]
4 Models and Tests
Model for the Evolution of Health and Wealth







it are health of husband and wife, and yit is log household wealth. As
explained in section 1, a model explaining the evolution of wealth and health should have
several features. First, it must capture immediate and lagged causal eﬀects of wealth
on health and of health on wealth. Second, it should allow for an eﬀect of each spouse’s
health on health of the other spouse, as a possible explanation for the association be-
tween CHI’s of both spouses. Third, it should take into account potentially correlated
unobserved heterogeneity in health and wealth, leading to a permanent correlation be-
tween wealth and health during the observation window. We use the following panel
data vector autoregressive model of order P for Yit, capturing all these features and
allowing for the various explanations of the health - wealth gradient:
ΓYit = Axit +
P ￿
p=1
ΦpYit−p + ηi + εit (1)
The matrices Γ,A and Φp,p = 1,...,P contain the parameters of the model. xit
is a vector of time invariant and time varying characteristics (education, race, age,
etc.). These can be correlated with a vector of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
terms ηi, capturing, e.g., genetic factors, early childhood events, etc. We will allow for
correlation among the three components of ηi within a couple, as well as among the three
transitory shocks in εit. The matrices Φ1,...,ΦP reﬂect causal links that take time to
become eﬀective. The coeﬃcients of lagged wealth in the health equations reﬂect causal
9wealth — health eﬀects, while those on lagged health in the wealth equation are health
— wealth eﬀects (Adda, 2003). Through the matrix Γ, we also allow for instantaneous
causality. In our case, this is particularly relevant since observations are spaced by two
years and causal eﬀects may become eﬀective faster than that.
To estimate the dynamic interactions between health and wealth consistently, it is
crucial to incorporate a lag structure that is ﬂexible enough to ﬁt the data. In particular,
the order of autoregression P has to be large enough. Speciﬁcation tests as in Arellano
and Bond (1991) will be used to select a model that satisﬁes this.
Since individual eﬀects can be correlated with the regressors in xit, it is not possible
to estimate the inﬂuence of time-invariant regressors or to disentangle the eﬀects of age
and a common time trend. We also do not explicitly incorporate risk behavior (smoking,
drinking, body-mass index). Risk behavior may be one of the mechanisms through which
SES aﬀects health, though it can only explain part of the association (Lantz et al.,
1998). Incorporating risk behavior variables would require a more structural approach
than followed in the current paper.
We ﬁrst consider the reduced form (RF) model from which instantaneous causality
is eliminated and explain how to estimate this model and how to test for causal eﬀects.
We then turn to the structural form (SF) with instantaneous causality.
Reduced-Form Vector Autoregressions
Consider the reduced form Vector Autoregression of (1):
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i = (hi0,...,hit), and xt
i = (xi0,...,xit).
10In model (2), this takes the form
H0 : C1,my = ... = CP,my = 0 (4)
where Cp,my is the m,y element of the matrix Cp, the eﬀect of p-periods lagged log
wealth on the husband’s health. Similarly, the null hypothesis of no causal eﬀects from
wealth to the wife’s health takes the form:
H0 : C1,fy = ... = CP,fy = 0 (5)
The null hypothesis of no causal eﬀects from the husband’s health to household















i) for t = 0,...,T (6)
In model (2), this takes the form
H0 : C1,ym = ... = CP,ym = 0. (7)
Similarly, the null hypothesis of no causal eﬀects of the wife’s health on household
wealth takes the form
H0 : C1,yf = ... = CP,yf = 0. (8)
Chamberlain (1984) labels (3) and (6) as “Grangernon-causality on unobservables.”Adams
et al. (2003) look at individuals (in the older AHEAD cohort) instead of couples. Their
tests are conditional on a covariates xit but not on unobserved heterogeneity η∗
i, and
they only consider ﬁrst order models. As Adams et al. (2003) emphasize, rejecting their
null hypothesis leads to the conclusion that y “Granger causes” h under the maintained
hypothesis that there is no unobserved heterogeneity. They expect that this is not a
major problem since they use a rich set of covariates xit.








i) = 0 for t = 2,...,T (9)
11First-diﬀerencing gets rid of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, but also introduces




is why the history up to t − 2, Y
t−2
i , and not Yi,t−1, is used to construct moments
(cf., e.g., Arellano and Bond, 1991). It implies that estimation (and testing for causal
health-wealth or wealth-health eﬀects) requires at least three observations per household.
If the health and wealth variables are close to non-stationary, then the instruments
obtained from (9) may be weak since changes will be weakly correlated with past levels
(see, e.g., Arellano, 2003). Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest solving this problem by
assuming mean stationarity of errors and individual eﬀects, leading to more moments
and improving the eﬃciency of the estimator. Following Blundell and Bond (1998) and
Arellano (2003), we impose the following additional moments:
E(∆Y
j
it−1(Yit − Bxit −
P ￿
p=1
CpYit−p)) = 0 for t = 3,...,T;j = 1,2,3 (10)
where Y
j
it−1,j = 1,2,3 are the components of the vector Yit−1. These moments are





i ) does not depend on t (11)





i ) = 0,j = 1,2,3 (13)
The ﬁrst of these implies that heterogeneity can be related to health or wealth shocks,
but only in a way that does not vary over time. This assumption is not completely
innocuous, since one may argue that the relation between permanent health endowments
and health shocks vary with age. The assumption can be tested with a Sargan diﬀerence
test on the additional over-identifying restrictions (and is not rejected in our ﬁnal model).
The second assumption was already made — it is the basis for (9). It is justiﬁed if all
12correlation over time is picked up by the auto-regressive structure (the matrices Φp,p =
1,...,P) and the unobserved heterogeneity terms. Asumption (13) is innocuous in
our case, since ∆xit only contains time dummies (with age diﬀerences linear in time and
other exogenous variables invariant over time). As Blundell and Bond (1998) emphasize,
imposing mean stationarity or not is a trade-oﬀ between robustness and eﬃciency. Hence
it is important to test the additional restrictions. We will do this using the increment
in the Sargan test statistic (cf. Arellano and Bond, 1991).
Structural Vector Autoregressions
In the structural form (1), the hypothesis of non-causality implies restrictions on both
the instantaneous eﬀects in Γ and the lagged eﬀects in Φp, similar to the restrictions in
(4). For example, non-causality of wealth to husband’s health implies:
H0 : Φ1,my =,...,= ΦP,my = Γmy = 0. (14)
These restrictions are stronger than those for the RF model, since the RF parameters
are linear combinations of the SF parameters that are restricted to zero under the null.
Thus the test on the reduced form will not have power for some violations of non-causality
in the structural form.
Without imposing additional identifying assumptions, we can estimate the RF pa-
rameters in (2) but not the SF parameters in Γ and Φp. Exclusion restrictions (i.e.,
instruments) are needed in order to identify the instantaneous causal mechanisms (cf.
Hausman, 2003). Our instruments for health and wealth relate to shocks that do not
have direct eﬀects on the other outcome, following Smith (2005), Wu (2003), and Meer
et al. (2003). As instruments for health changes, we use onsets of critical health condi-
tions. Such onsets are quite frequent for our sample (Table 2). It seems plausible that
they have no direct eﬀect on wealth and thus can only aﬀect wealth through the change
in overall health that they induce. We use separate dummies for severe and mild onsets.
To instrument changes in wealth, we use inheritances. In each wave, about 5% of
13the households in the sample receive an inheritance; the median inheritance is $29,000
and the mean is $64,100). While the death of a family member might be correlated with
the level of health due to genetic background or early childhood events etc., it seems
reasonable to assume that it is not directly related to current health changes, making
the inheritance an appropriate instrument for wealth changes. We use two instruments
here: a dummy whether or not the couple received an inheritance in the last two years,
and the size of that inheritance in dollars (0 if no inheritance was received).
To identify the instantaneous eﬀect of health of one spouse on health of the other
spouse, we also use the onsets of health conditions. Here we make the plausible assump-
tion that such onsets have no direct eﬀect on the other spouse other than through the
constructed health index. We will test the overidentifying restrictions this implies.
As for the reduced form, we exploit the moments based upon mean stationarity of
the errors and test these using the incremental Sargan test. Tests for "lagged" causality
essentially remain the same as (3) and (6), except that they involve the matrices Φp
instead of Cp. Tests for contemporaneous causation test whether elements of Γ are zero.
5 Results
To estimate the models we used the generalized method of moments (GMM; cf., e.g.,
Arellano and Bond, 1991).7 The additional mean stationarity moments (see Section
4) were not rejected by incremental Sargan tests.8 We include time dummies to pick-
up unobserved trends and, where necessary as indicated by speciﬁcation tests rejecting
invariance of coeﬃcients over time, we also include interactions with a time trend.9
We estimate the three equations separately. We experimented with several lag struc-
7Since the cross-sectional dimension is quite large, we are not concerned about ﬁnite sample biases
of two-step GMM, and use two-step GMM estimates constructing the optimal weighting matrix from
ﬁrst-step estimates.
8The test statistics are 13.87 (df=14; p=0.459), 4.99 (df=10; p=0.892) and 10.47 (df=10; p=0.401)
in the wealth, husband’s health and wife’s health equation respectively.
9In our ﬁxed eﬀects models, this may also be interpreted as an interaction with age.
14tures and found that speciﬁcations with two lags (for wealth dynamics) and three lags
(for health dynamics) were needed according to the usual speciﬁcation tests (the Sar-
gan test on overidentifying restrictions and the test on second order autocorrelation in
the diﬀerenced residuals; see Arellano and Bond, 1991).10 The results for the selected
models are presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6. Each table presents a reduced form equation
without instantaneous eﬀects of wealth on health etc., and a structural form equation
in which the instruments proposed in Section 3 are used for identiﬁcation.
Eﬀects of Health on Wealth
Table 4 presents the results for equations explaining log household wealth. For the
selected models, overidentifying restrictions are only mildly rejected at the 5% level (p-
value=0.04). There is no evidence of second order serial correlation in the diﬀerenced
errors, supporting the hypothesis that the errors in levels are uncorrelated over time.
The reduced form estimates and joint tests on coeﬃcients of the lagged health imply
signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of health of both spouses on log wealth.
[Table 4 about here]
The structural estimates provide no evidence for an immediate eﬀect of husband’s
health on wealth, and the eﬀects of the lagged husband’s health indicator are similar
to those in the RF equation. The joint signiﬁcance of all husband’s health variables
remains. Current and lagged CHI of the wife are also jointly signiﬁcant, but the imme-
diate negative eﬀect dominates the lagged eﬀects. Thus, overall, we ﬁnd strong evidence
of causal eﬀects of both spouses’ health on household wealth. Moreover, the results of
the structural model suggest an instantaneous eﬀect for wives and a lagged eﬀect for
husbands. This may explain the diﬀerence with Wu (2003), who uses only two waves of
the HRS and ﬁnds that the wealth of households tends to respond more to health events
10With one lag, the Sargan test statistic of the reduced-form model is 58.21 (df=36) for the wealth
equation. With two lags, it is 49.2 (df=30) and 54.4 (df=30) in the husband’s and wife’s health equation
respectively. Thus these speciﬁcations are strongly rejected.
15of the wife than to health events of the husband. A longer time span is needed to ﬁnd
the eﬀect of the husband’s health.
Eﬀects on Health of Wealth and Spouse’s Health
The results for the equation explaining the husband’s health are presented in Table
5. Adding the second order lags and the interaction of lagged health with time was
necessary to obtain a model that passes the tests on overidentifying restrictions and
autocorrelation in the errors. The results provide no evidence whatsoever of an eﬀect
of wealth on husband’s health. In both RF and SF, the wealth variables are jointly
(and individually) insigniﬁcant. We also ﬁnd no evidence of a causal eﬀect of the wife’s
health on the husband’s health. Similarly, Table 6 presents the results for the equations
explaining the wife’s health. They provide no evidence of causal eﬀects from household
wealth on the wife’s health or from the husband’s health on the wife’s health.
[Tables 5 and 6 about here]
6 Unobserved Heterogeneity, Lag Structure, and Other
Sensitivity Checks
In this section we ﬁrst investigate the nature of unobserved heterogeneity in the model of
Section 5. Second, we compare the results of that model with those of simpler models, to
see whether they really lead to diﬀerent conclusions. Finally, we perform some robustness
checks and we consider alternative deﬁnitions of health and wealth.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
The GMM residuals in each of the three equations are estimates of the sum of the
error term and the unobserved heterogeneity term. Taking individual means over time
gives an estimate of the unobserved heterogeneity term. These estimates can be used to
16estimate the covariance matrix of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, accounting for the
small number of residuals (3, due to the required lags) used for each individual. Table
7 presents the estimated covariance matrix. For the wealth equation the unobserved
heterogeneity term explains a substantial share of the total unexplained variance (1.12,
about 82% of the total unexplained variance, 1.37). For the husband’s and wife’s health
equations, the estimated shares are much smaller: 8.9% and 6.9%, respectively. The
correlations between the individual eﬀects are also small.
[Table 7 about here]
Table 8 shows how the estimated individual eﬀects (i.e., the household speciﬁc time
means of the GMM residuals) in the three equations correlate with background variables
measured at wave 1. The relations are mostly as expected - keeping other background
variables constant, ﬁxed eﬀects in the wealth equation are higher for husbands with
more education, for households where both spouses are white compared to households
with at least one black or Hispanic spouse, and for households where the wife is more
active in ﬁnancial planning. We ﬁnd no relation with health behavior or survival status
of parents in the wealth equation. For the ﬁxed eﬀects in the health equations, we ﬁnd
that health behaviors (both obesity and smoking) play a signiﬁcant role. For wives, a
negative correlation between the number of living parents and bad health is found as
well as a positive correlation between manual occupation and health.
[Table 8 about here]
Models with no Unobserved Heterogeneity or Fewer Lags
We estimated some models that do not allow for unobserved heterogeneity and are more
similar to the models analyzed by others. Tests for the hypothesis that wealth does not
cause husband’s and wife’s health are presented in Table 9, based upon models that
17explain health of husband and wife from lagged health of husband and wife, lagged log
wealth, and additional controls (demographics and past risk behavior).11. To increase
comparability with Adams et al. (2003), we not only do this for CHI (ﬁrst column)
but also for the separate health variables used to construct CHI. We model (number
of) ADLs, CESD score and self-reported general health as ordered probits, onsets as
binary probits (for at least one mild or severe onset), and CHI as a continuous outcome.
Standard errors are corrected for clustering of errors within households. We vary the
number of lags of the dependent variable to check if allowing for more lags in levels leads
to diﬀerent conclusions.
[Table 9 about here]
In the ﬁrst order models, the non-causality test is a joint test on the coeﬃcient of
(yt−1,yt−2,yt−1 ×t). For husbands, the null is rejected in two out of six cases. For CHI,
the null of no causality is rejected at the 10% level but not at the 5% level. For wives, the
null of no causality from wealth to health is rejected in three out of six cases, including
the case of CHI. This result diﬀers from that in the complete model, where we found no
signiﬁcant eﬀect of household wealth on the wife’s health.
If more lags are added, the results provide much weaker evidence of causal wealth to
health eﬀects. Only for one of the husband’s health indicators (CESD) and one of the
wife’s health indicators (severe onset) a signiﬁcant eﬀect is found. Thus allowing for a
richer lag structure makes a substantial diﬀerence.12
Table 9 also presents tests for causal eﬀects of the wife’s health on the husband’s
health and vice versa (controlling for wealth etc.). Non-causality from the wife’s health






t−1×t) are all zero.
11The regression results are in Appendix C (available upon request)
12To check if unobserved heterogeneity plays a role in these last two cases, we also estimated the
dynamic FE models with speciﬁcations as in Tables 5 and 6 for the husbands’ CESD index and the
wives’ onset of a severe condition as the dependent variable. None of the eﬀects remain signiﬁcant at
any conventional level, implying that the two rejections of no causality in models with three lags in
Table 9 can be ascribed to not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
18First-order models suggest causality: In four out of six cases, a signiﬁcant (and positive)
eﬀect of the wife’s health on the husband’s health is found and the eﬀect of the husband’s
health on the wife’s health is signiﬁcantly positive in three cases. The signiﬁcance levels
of the eﬀects on the spouse’s mental health (CESD scores) are the highest. The results
for CHI would suggest causal eﬀects in both directions. With the higher order models,
the only signiﬁcant eﬀect is an eﬀect of husband’s health on the wife’s mental health (the
CESD score). Interestingly, this eﬀect does not disappear if we estimate a dynamic FE
model for the wife’s CESD index. This suggests a genuine causal eﬀect of the husband’s
health on the wife’s mental health. In models for the aggregated CHI health measure,
this eﬀect remains undetected since it gets swamped with the insigniﬁcant eﬀects for
other health dimensions.
Comparing the results for CHI with those in Tables 5 and 6 thus suggests that in-
corporating an appropriate lag structure makes the largest diﬀerence. Once this is done,
controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects in the CHI models does not change the conclusions about
causality. This is in line with the conclusion from Table 7 that unobserved heterogeneity
terms in the health equations are small. For the wealth equation, all models lead to the
same conclusion - there are signiﬁcant causal eﬀects of both spouses’ health indexes on
household wealth.
Other Robustness Checks
A potential concern with our GMM estimates is ﬁnite sample bias due to weak instru-
ments. Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) suggest several alternative estimators that
avoid the GMM bias due to weak instruments. We computed Symmetrically Normalized
IV (SNIV) estimates, which have similar properties as LIML but are easier to compute.
See Appendix D (available upon request), Table D.1, for the RF estimates. The estima-
tion results for our favorite speciﬁcation are similar to the results presented in Tables
4, 5 and 6. Moreover, the causality tests give the same conclusions — the null of no
causality is not rejected for wealth to health (p-values 0.948 for husbands and 0.204 for
wives in the RF model) or from the wife’s to the husband’s health (p-value 0.553) or
19vice versa (p-value 0.932), but no causality from husband’s or wife’s health to household
wealth is strongly rejected (p-values <0.001 and 0.002). The similarity of GMM and
SNIV estimates suggests that we do not have a weak instruments problem.
Another robustness check concerns the log transformation of wealth, which may be
seen as treating negative wealth values in a somewhat ad hoc manner. An alternative
is the hyperbolic transformation of Adams et al. (2003). Again, we ﬁnd essentially the
same results – no causality from health to wealth is ﬁrmly rejected (p-values <0.001 for
husband’s and wife’s health), but neither no causality from wealth to health (p-values
0.131 for husband’s health and 0.301 for the wife’s health), nor no causality from the
wife’s health on the husband’s health (p-value 0.647) or vice versa (p-value 0.721) can
be rejected. See Appendix D, Table D.2.
Finally, there is some concern whether our results are aﬀected by selective attrition.
Mortality is a source of attrition and is also related to health, making it unlikely that
attrition is random. Following Nijman and Verbeek (1996), we compared the estimation
results based upon balanced and unbalanced panels. If there is no attrition bias, both
estimators have the same probability limit and their diﬀerence is expected to be small.
On the other hand, if attrition is selective, both estimators are inconsistent with diﬀerent
probability limits, and they can be expected to give diﬀerent results. Nijman and Ver-
beek (1996) use this intuition to construct a Hausman type test based upon the diﬀerence
in the estimates and show that this test has more power than other, added-regressors
type, tests.
In this paper we are primarily interested in whether attrition aﬀects our conclusions
about causality. We therefore compare the causality test outcomes for the balanced and
unbalanced panels. the results are the same, suggesting that selective attrition does not
drive the outcomes of the tests. For example wealth does not Granger cause husband’s
or wife’s health in the balanced sample using reduced-form models (p-value = 0.642 and
0.623 respectively compared to 0.713 and 0.691 with all observations).
This does not mean that selective attrition has no eﬀect on the parameter estimates.
As shown in Table D.3 in Appendix D, we reject the null that attrition is random for log
20wealth and husband’s health equation but not for the wife’s health. A more structural
framework to account for the relations between attrition, wealth and health is needed to
address the issue more satisfactorily. But this requires a very diﬀerent approach which
is beyond the goals of the current paper.
Disaggregation
Using the CHI incorporating all features of health, we found clear evidence of causal
eﬀects of both the husband’s and the wife’s health on household wealth. We estimated
a similar dynamic panel data model using separate indicators for physical and mental
health (Appendix E (available upon request), Table E.1). The physical health index
combines all onsets except depression and ADL’s, the mental health index combines
the CESD score with the onset of depression. We found evidence of causal eﬀects on
household wealth of the husband’s physical health and the wife’s physical and mental
health, but not of the husband’s mental health. The eﬀect of the wife’s mental health
is instantaneous, while the eﬀect of the husband’s physical health is not, in line with
the diﬀerence between husbands and wives found earlier (Table 4). The stronger wealth
eﬀect of the wife’s mental health status than of the husband’s status is in line with Wu’s
(2003) argument that household expenditures increase if the wife can no longer perform
tasks such as cooking and cleaning. The stronger eﬀect of the husband’s physical health
might relate to his role as breadwinner. A model that simultaneously considers labor
force participation and earnings would be needed to investigate this further. This would
be an interesting direction for future research.
An explanation for the strong eﬀects of mental health may be the lack of insurance
coverage for mental health problems. Since their coverage by Medicare and Medicaid is
limited, employer-provided or other additional insurance coverage is necessary to protect
against mental disease onsets (Adams et al., 2003). To investigate this, we disaggregated
the sample by health insurance coverage status, estimating separate models for couples
where none had insurance coverage in their ﬁrst wave and couples where both had
coverage. We found that rejection of non-causality from health to wealth is more frequent
21for couples who lack health insurance (Table E.2 in Appendix E). Immediate eﬀects of
mental health problems are stronger among non-insured couples. This suggests that
health expenditure is an important channel for the eﬀect of health on wealth in this
age group, in particular for the uninsured. More research is needed to analyze this
conjecture.
7 Conclusion
This paper uses dynamic panel data models to test for causal eﬀects of health on socioe-
conomic status and vice versa for elderly couples in the US. The two main diﬀerences
with earlier approaches is that this allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity and
to select an appropriate lag structure using speciﬁcation tests. Six biennial waves of
couples in the HRS were used, following the 1931-1941 birth cohort from 1992 until
2002.
Our dynamic panel data model based tests provide clear evidence of causal eﬀects
from health to wealth, but no evidence of causal eﬀects from wealth to either the hus-
band’s or the wife’s health, or from one spouse’s health on the health of the other spouse.
Sensitivity analysis shows that simpler models without unobserved heterogeneity or with
too few lags give biased results — they suggest causal eﬀects of wealth on the health of
both spouses. The covariance structure of the residuals suggests that unobserved hetero-
geneity in wealth plays a more important role than in both husband’s and wife’s health
(where state dependence can explain almost all correlation over time).
Disaggregating health into mental and physical health show that mental health is
more important for wives while only physical health matters for husbands. While the
mental health eﬀects are instantaneous, the physical health eﬀects take more time and
are visible only in the next wave (two years later). Insurance coverage also appears to
play a role here: it is mainly if wives without employer-provided insurance experience
an onset of mental conditions that household assets decline.
The fact that we ﬁnd no causal links from wealth to health for the age groups
22considered does not mean that such a causal link never operated earlier in life — we only
consider households with one or both spouses in their ﬁfties. It would be interesting to
apply the same approach to younger households. It would also be interesting to look at
diﬀerent countries, and see whether the institutional setting makes a diﬀerence (Deaton,
2003; Hurd and Kapteyn, 2003).
Further research could also explicitly incorporate the role of labor force participation
and earnings. The respondents in the HRS cohort that we consider are typically at work
in the ﬁrst wave and have retired before the last wave. One of the potential channels of
health-wealth causality is through labor supply and earnings, making it worthwhile to
extend the model with labor supply (and the decision to retire) and earnings. Another
interesting extension would be to model access to health insurance and the nature of
health insurance, since this may be an important mechanism through which health
aﬀects wealth.
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25Table 1: Composition of Household Wealth
Wealth components 1992 2002
median (% with asset) median (% with asset)
Liquid wealth 38.81 (74.1) 80.0 (47.8)
IRAs 31.57 (45.1) 68.24 (47.2)
Stocks 25.24 (32.1) 50.0 (37.4)
Bonds 12.62 (6.9) 35.0 (8.6)
Checking/savings account 6.56 (86.2) 10.0 (89.1)
Certiﬁcates of deposit 10.10 (29.5) 20.0 (26.9)
Treasury bills/Saving bonds
Debt (subtracted) 3.78 (41.0) 5.0 (28.2)
Non-liquid wealth 103.51 (97.2) 136.0 (99.0)
Primary residence 100.98 (87.9) 130.0 (92.3)
Mortgage (subtracted) 37.87 (50.6) 56.0 (35.5)
Other real estate 56.80 (27.4) 70.0 (21.3)
Business assets 88.36 (15.2) 150.0 (13.4)
Transportation/vehicles assets 12.62 (95.9) 15.0 (95.7)
Total wealth (bus. excluded) 142.64 (95.5) 211.0 (99.0)
Number of households 4150 2468
NOTES: Wealth in thousands of 2002 US dollars. Ownership rates in paren-
theses. Other debts or loans not shown in the table but enter negatively in
the calculation of liquid wealth. Business assets not included.
26Table 2: Health of Husbands and Wives
Health Indicators Husbands Wives
Mean/Fraction reporting condition 1992 2002 1992 2002
Self-Reported Health 2.577 2.754 2.420 2.594
Severe Condition (ever had) 0.238 0.449 0.167 0.317
Cancer 0.039 0.132 0.059 0.119
Heart condition 0.148 0.286 0.072 0.153
Lung Disease 0.062 0.091 0.049 0.087
Stroke 0.038 0.075 0.017 0.045
Mild Condition (ever had) 0.565 0.813 0.554 0.799
Diabetes 0.101 0.208 0.076 0.138
High blood pressure 0.359 0.538 0.285 0.492
Arthritis 0.299 0.562 0.358 0.632
Emotional/psychological problems 0.044 0.089 0.082 0.184
At least one ADL 0.045 0.105 0.034 0.102
CESD score 0.585 0.939 0.706 1.290
Body-Mass Index 27.31 27.98 26.76 27.82
Number of respondents 4160 2463 4160 2463
NOTES: Fractions with given conditions and means of quantitative
health indicators. 1992 columns: all couples in 1992; 2002 columns:
couples still in the panel in 2002. Self-reported health: scale from
1 (excellent) to 5 (poor); ADLs: limitations in performing activities
of daily life; CESD scores: based upon eight questions on mental
health; a higher score implies worse mental health.
27Table 3: The Health-Wealth Gradient
Median wealth (in ‘000’s)
Husband’s Health Index 1992 2002
best (1st) quartile 172 283
2nd quartile 144 208
%∆ 2nd — 1st -16.2% -26.5%
3rd quartile 141 191
%∆ 3rd — 1st -18% -32.5%
worst (4th) quartile 84 119
%∆ 4th — 1st -51.2% -57.9%
Wife’s Health Index 1992 2002
best (1st) quartile 186 294
2nd quartile 172 265
%∆ 2nd — 1st -7.3% -9.8%
3rd quartile 116 177
%∆ 3rd — 1st -37.6% -39.8%
worst (4th) quartile 82 106
%∆ 4th — 1st -55.9% -63.9%
NOTES: Median total household wealth in
thousands 2002 US dollars by constructed
health index quartile in 1992, and percentage
diﬀerence with ﬁrst quartile.
28Table 4: Dynamic Model for Household Wealth
Reduced form Structural
Covariates Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
yt−1 0.157 2.86 0.154 2.84
yt−2 0.027 1.2 0.021 0.92
yt−1×t -0.022 -1.28 -0.021 -1.22
hm
t - -0.218 -1.48
hm
t−1 -0.720 -4.95 -0.586 -3.53
hm
t−2 -0.308 -3.70 -0.249 -2.75
hm
t−1×t 0.109 3.42 0.112 3.57
h
f
t - -0.434 -2.40
h
f
t−1 -0.402 -2.67 -0.155 -0.86
h
f
t−2 0.038 0.48 0.123 1.51
h
f
t−1×t 0.020 0.6 0.022 0.68
χ2 p-value χ2 p-value
Sargan p-value 45.64 0.04 46.75 0.04


































NOTES: Two-step system GMM estimates imposing mean
stationarity.
29Table 5: Dynamic Model for the Husband’s Health
Reduced Form Structural
Covariates Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
hm
t−1 0.571 12.63 0.571 11.75
hm
t−2 0.272 15.12 0.272 14.18
hm
t−3 0.102 4.76 0.100 4.65
hm






t−1 0.052 1.45 0.033 0.74
h
f
t−2 -0.003 -0.21 -0.014 -0.7
h
f
t−1×t -0.009 -1.07 -0.010 -1.21
yt -0.003 -0.13
yt−1 0.001 0.04 0.001 0.10
yt−2 -0.002 -0.41 -0.002 -0.43
yt−1×t -0.001 -0.24 -0.001 -0.27
p-value p-value


















t−2 . . 0.547
yt,yt−1,t × yt−1,yt−2 . . 0.961
N 3051 3051
NOTES: Two-step system GMM estimates imposing mean
stationarity.
30Table 6: Dynamic Model for the Wife’s Health
Reduced form Structural
Covariates Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
h
f
t−1 0.574 13.25 0.570 13.16
h
f
t−2 0.254 13.1 0.253 13.11
h
f
t−3 0.080 3.73 0.082 3.82
h
f
t−1×t 0.004 0.37 0.003 0.29
hm
t . . 0.031 0.80
hm
t−1 0.045 1.21 0.003 0.06
hm
t−2 0.002 0.17 -0.018 -0.96
hm
t−1×t -0.007 -0.76 -0.004 -0.45
yt . . -0.034 -1.33
yt−1 0.007 0.73 0.007 0.61
yt−2 -0.002 -0.54 -0.001 -0.21
yt−1×t -0.001 -0.35 0.001 -0.12
p-value p-value













t−2 . . 0.552
yt,yt−1,t × yt−1,yt−2 . . 0.988
N 3051 3051
NOTES: Two-step system GMM estimates imposing mean
stationarity.
31Table 7: Covariance Structure of Individual Eﬀects
covariance matrix wealth husband’s health wife’s health
wealth 1.119 (81.5%)
husband’s health 0.019 0.019 (8.9%)
wife’s health 0.012 -0.003 0.016 (6.9%)
NOTES: The percentages in parentheses are the percentages of the un-
systematic variance accounted for by the unobserved heterogeneity terms
ηi in each equation. The variances and covariances are estimated using
residuals from structural models in Tables 5, 6 and 7. Using observa-
tions in the balanced panel only, the covariance matrix can be constructed
as follows: Denote the GMM residuals by ˆ u
j
it, j = 1,2,3, i = 1,...,n,
t = P + 1(= 4),...,T(= 6). Let ˆ η
j
i = (T − P)−1 ￿T
t=P+1 ˆ u
j
it (a point es-
timate for the individual eﬀect). Under the assumptions of stationarity and
independence of individual eﬀects and error terms, it is easy to show that a
consistent estimator (with T ﬁxed and n → ∞) for Cov(u
j
it,uk
it) is given by
(T − P − 1)−1[(T − P) ˆ Cov(ˆ η
j
i,ˆ ηk
i,) − ˆ Cov(ˆ u
j
it, ˆ uk
it)], where ˆ Cov denotes the
sample covariance. Similar consistent estimators can be constructed using
observations that are not in the balanced panel, particularly households ob-
served 5 consecutive times for which we have 3 (2 health) GMM residuals.
The reported numbers are weighted averages of the covariance matrix esti-
mates using households with 6 and 5 panel observations, weighted with the
numbers of such households.
32Table 8: Correlates of the Estimated Individual Eﬀects
Male Estimates Female Estimates
Covariates Wealth Health Covariates Wealth Health
age m 0.193* -0.049** age f 0.125 0.015
age2 m -0.014 0.004** age2 f -0.008 -0.001
high school m 0.670** -0.023 high school f 0.564** -0.026
college & above m 0.908** -0.022 college & above f 0.653** -0.029
high school (m,father) 0.185 0.016 high school (f, father) 0.106 -0.027
college & above (m,father) 0.425** -0.023 college & above (f,father) 0.139 -0.041*
living parents (m) -0.021 -0.013 living parents (f) 0.035 -0.024**
BMI [30,35] (m) -0.011 0.053** BMI [30,35] (f) 0.141 0.032*
BMI [35,+] (m) 0.091 0.062* BMI [35,+] (f) 0.015 0.141**
ever smoked (m) -0.007 0.031** ever smoked (f) -0.046 0.047**
manual occup. (m) 0.045 -0.003 manual occup. (f) 0.259 0.038*
occup. missing (m) -0.123 -0.034 occup. missing (f) -0.131 0.034
risk averse (m) 0.192 -0.019 risk averse (f) 0.113 0.002
aversion missing (m) -0.301 -0.023 aversion missing (f) -0.302 0.092
plan few years ahead (m) 0.161 0.032 plan few years ahead (f) 0.161 0.013
plean 5> years ahead (m) 0.190 0.034* plean 5> years ahead (f) 0.225** -0.002
planning missing 0.352 0.028 planning missing -0.173 0.056
African-American -0.908 0.023 African-American -0.908 0.003
Hispanic -0.565 0.002 Hispanic -0.565 -0.043
constant -12.513 1.196 Constant -12.513 -0.458
N 3051 3051
NOTES: parameter estimates from linear regression with robust standard errors. The equa-
tion for wealth includes all characteristics of both spouses. The equations for individual
health eﬀects are spouse-speciﬁc. Two stars denotes statistical signiﬁcance at level lower
than 5 pct, One star at 10 pct level. m=male; f=female.
33Table 9: Levels Test for Health
Husbands (over all waves)
Test (Chi-sq & p-value) Health Index Severe Onset Mild Onset Self-Report CESD ADL
Joint Test Wealth (df=3)
One Lag of health 2.22 1.45 9.41 1.15 22.76 3.33
0.083 0.693 0.023 0.0764 <0.001 0.348
Three Lags of health 0.07 0.86 6.30 1.93 14.3 1.39
0.978 0.836 0.098 0.586 0.002 0.704
Joint Test Spouse’s
Health (df=3)
One Lag of health 7.3 7.09 1.15 13.41 19.54 7.91
<0.001 0.069 0.764 0.003 <0.001 0.048
Three Lags of health 0.81 4.96 0.84 4.27 6.08 3.78
0.486 0.180 0.838 0.234 0.108 0.287
Wives (over all waves)
Covariates Health Index Severe Onset Mild Onset Self-Report CESD ADL
Joint Test Wealth (df=3)
One Lag of health 6.37 8.76 11.17 4.54 1.43 5.87
<0.001 0.032 0.011 0.201 0.69 0.118
Three Lags of health 1.76 9.31 7.79 2.04 2.75 2.1
0.153 0.025 0.051 0.565 0.433 0.558
Joint Test Spouse’s
Health (df=3)
One Lag of health 5.19 1.81 1.77 13.3 17.58 2.33
0.001 0.612 0.622 0.004 <0.001 0.507
Three Lag of health 0.97 1.03 0.67 9.69 12.31 0.84
0.408 0.793 0.879 0.021 0.006 0.83
NOTES: Speciﬁcation of Non-causality tests as in Table 5 and 6. The chi-square tests have 3 degrees
of freedom. Model for health index is estimated by OLS; models for self-reported health, CESD scores
and ADL count are ordered probits; models for the remaining variables are probits. Errors are clustered
at the household level. Controls for demographics and lagged risk factors included. Detailed results
available upon request.
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